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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ACCULOG, INC., a State of 
Colorado corporation, ROBERT 
PFISTER and KENTON SHAW, 
co-partners doing business 
under the firm name and style 
of ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES, CASE NO. 18133 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KEITH PETERSON, dba 
PETERSON FORD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON THE ISSUE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS' COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND IN NOT BAR-
RING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM ARGUING TO THE JURY 
THAT FAILURE TO HAVE A FIRE EXTINGUISHER CON-
STITUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS 
The Respondent's Brief confirms that there was no issue 
of negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs to be presented to 
the jury. All "issues" raised by the Defendant are without sup-
port in the evidentiary record. All "issues" raised by the Defen-
dant necessarily would have required the jury to speculate. 
The Respondent's Brief first attempts to dredge up two rea· 
sons, in addition to his improper fire extinguisher argument, 
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that the jury "could" have used to find the Plaintiffs' negligent. 
The Defendant now attempts to advance these reasons even though 
trial counsel did not consider them worthy of being argued to the 
jury. 
.·First, the Defendant cites the testimony of Mr. Shaw 
where 'he states that he and Mr. Gates had smelled gasoline for a 
minute or two before the fire. The Defendant's brief conveniently 
ignores the prior testimony of Jim Gates wherein Gates testified 
that it took time to investigate and locate the source of the 
.gasoline odor since they had a gasoline can inside the van which 
also omitted an odor: 
Q Do you recall about what time you were done logging 
the final hole that day? 
A I believe it was a quarter until 9:00. 
Q And, again, prior to that time, had you observed any 
functional problem of any kind with the van? 
A No. 
Q What occurred at that time? 
A Well, we finished our job and wrapped everything up 
and proceeded to come back to town. And we had made 
it, oh, a couple of miles at the most and we smelled 
some gasoline. And, at first, you know, we weren't 
sure exactly what it was, and I turned around to see 
if it could have been the gas can that we kept there 
in the van, but it wasn't. 
Q What gas can are you ref erring to now? 
A We 
1
have a two-gallon gas can that we used to run our 
generator. 
Q Where was it located? 
A It's a gas can that is located in the middle section 
of the van. 
Q All right. Where were you and Mr. Shaw at that time 
in the van? 
-2-
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A Kenton was driving, and I was in the passenger's 
seat. 
Q All right. Now, you were testifying regarding smell-
ing the gasoline, and you thought it might be related 
to that can. Go ahead and tell us about that again. 
A I smelled the gasoline--I don't think any words were 
spoken, but I looked at Kenton and I realized that he 
acknowledged something was out of norm. And I smelled 
around to see if I could locate it. 
Q 
A 
And it did seem to be coming from the engine com-
partment. And within a minute of that, there was a 
pop, and Kenton--well, the~e was a pop. I'll let it 
go at that. 
Is that the best you can describe it, or is that an 
accurate description of what happened? 
Well, it was kind of a kawoosh sound. It wasn't real 
sharp or real loud, but we knew something had happened. 
Q And what happened then? 
A We stopped the van and got out. And I think Kenton 
mentioned that he saw some flames, or something. And 
we went around in front of the vehicle to see if we 
could extinguish the fire. And we proceeded in that 
manner. We threw dirt and rocks and everything we 
could find on the engine. 
Q Before we come to that, let's go back to the point 
before you even got out of the van, if we could. How 
fast was the van traveling at that time? 
A Oh, a couple of miles an hour, I guess. 
at a very slow rate. 
It was going 
The Defendant's brief, after citing the alleged unreason-
able delay in stopping the van, then asserts that the jury should 
have been allowed to speculate that, had the Plaintiffs stopped 
the engine a few seconds prior to the ignition of the gasoline, 
which had squirted on the engine, " ... there probably would have 
been no fire, explosion or damage to the engine or any portion of 
the van." (Respondent's Brief at page 10) . This is pure specula-
tion on the part of the Defendant. The Defendant cites no testi-
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many whatsoever to prove that stopping the engine would have pre-
vented the fire. In fact, the testimony of the Plaintiff's ex-
pert, which the jury accepted, was to just the opposite conclusion 
namely, that the fire was caused by gasoline collecting on the 
top of the hot engine and then being ignited by hot engine compo-
nents (T. 114-119). Even had the engine been stopped a few 
seconds earlier, the hot engine components could still have ig-
nited the gasoline which had been squirted out of the defectively 
. 
installed fuel filter. The burden was on the Defendant to prove 
.alleged negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant 
did not meet his burden because he did not provide any evidence 
to prove that a few seconds delay in stopping the engine would 
have prevented the hot engine components from igniting the gaso-
1 ine. ~ 
Second, the Defendant's brief seeks to find negligence on 
the part of the Plaintiffs because they did not have the Def en-
dant's employees check into the possibility that the van's orig-
inal "cuttj_ng out" problem had been caused by a non-standard ig-
nition system. This again asks the Court to speculate that some-
thing else caused the fire. However, nobody, not the Plaintiffs' 
expert, Mr~ Caldwell, nor the Defendant's expert, Dr. Lirnpert, 
nor the Defendant's mechanics, nor anyone else, testified that a 
faulty ignition system caused the fire. To the absolute con-
trary, Dr. Limpert and Mr. Caldwell both agreed that the fire was 
a fuel system fire and not an ignition system caused fire (T. 114-
119, T. 29L~). 
When the foregoing have been objectively considered, it 
becomes clear why the Defendant's counsel did not argue these 
-4-
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"issues" to the jury. They were pure speculation with no b;1sis 
in the record to support them. There was no issue of comparat.ive 
negligence to go to the jury except as related, erroneously, to 
the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher. 
·While the Defendant attempts to quote the court to show 
that the court believed that there were other negligent acts of 
the Plaintiffs which caused the fire (Respondent's Brief at page 
22), the statement relied upon shows that the court was only 
talking of possible negligent acts of the Plaintiffs in failing 
to mitigate damages by not putting out the fire in the best way once 
the fire had begun. The court stated: 
But I think it's a legitimate matter and 
can be handled by both of you in your argu-
ments in having it considered as one of the 
negligent acts, if it is considered to be a 
negligent act by the jury that affects some 
portion of the damages, possibly. (T. 340-342). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court clearly was not talking about negligent causation of 
the fire but rather of failure to mitigate damages by using a 
fire extinguisher once the fire had occurred. This may be fur-
ther verified by referring to the entire content of the court's 
remarks which are set forth in pages 12-14 of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
Completely aside from the foregoing, remains the fact 
that by permitting the Defendant's fire extinguisher argument the 
court improperly invited the jury to find that the Plaintiffs' 
failure to have a fire extinguisher constituted comparative 
negligence and further invited the jury to speculate without the 
aid of any evidence that a fire extinguisher would have in fact 
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prevented the damage caused to the van and its contents. The 
fire extinguisher argument constitutes reversible error aside 
from the question of whether or not other actions of the Plain-
tiffs were negligent since the argument was clearly prejudicial 
in and of itself. 
The Defendant's guest vs. host statute argument and the 
cases related thereto are simply inapposite to the Plaintiffs' 
case since they all involve an element of a conscious and knowing 
assumption of the risk by a guest who enters into a vehicle where 
.a known present danger exists. The Plaintiffs in the case before 
the court did not know that the Defendant was going to cause their 
vehicle to burn down. Only if they had known, could they be held 
responsible for failing to put a fire extinguisher into their van .. 
The seat belt analogy asserted by the Plaintiffs is directly on 
point since a person in a car does not know that someone else is 
going to negligently drive into him and cause him injury. Hampton 
v. State Highway Commission, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P2d 236 (1972). As 
noted in the ,Plaintiff's prior brief, the State of Washington has 
refused to allow the use of comparative negligence_principals to 
defeat an injured person's right to recover against a negligent 
driver of another automobile where the injured person was not 
wearing a seat belt. Amend v. Bell, Wash., 570 P2d 138, 95 ALR 
3d 225 (1977). The courts have been unwilling to give a wrongful 
defendant such a windfall to avoid liability and this court should 
not become the exception to the overwhelming rule. Fischer v. 
Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P2d 458 (1973). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT 
OF 86% OF THE NEGLIGENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
As has been shown by the Plaintiff's rebuttal in Point I, 
there was no evidence before the court to enable the jury to find 
that the Plaintiffs were more negligent than was the Defendant. 
The evidence was so totally lacking that the jury could find 
against the Plaintiffs on the issue of comparative negligence 
.only by speculating that a fire extinguisher would have stopped 
the fire in the engine compartment and, thereby, prevented 86% 
of the damage. 
The whole of the evidence makes clear that the Plaintiffs 
could never have been 86% at fault for the fire. Therefore, there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and a new 
trial should be granted if a directed verdict is not ordered in 
favor of the Plaintiffs as requested in Point I. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS' HAD FAILED TO PROVE A LOSS OF 
PROFITS 
Rather than restate the Plaintiffs' position regarding 
the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' evidence, the Court is respect-
fully and earnestly directed to the detailed treatment of the 
facts and evidence set forth in the Plaintiffs' prior brief. 
Comments here will be limited to rebutting specific arguments set 
forth by the Defendant. 
First, the Defendant, at pages 27 and 28 of its brief, 
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quotes testimony by Mr. Canter in an attempt to show a lack of 
sufficient certainty as to the Plaintiffs' loss of profits. The 
key point here is that the testimony quoted does not go to calcu-
lation of lost profits or to whether or not the Plaintiffs were 
awarded ~ontracts by Amoco Minerals. 
The context of the testimony clearly shows that Mr. Canter 
was testifying of his attempts to find work for the Plaintiffs' 
logging units during the time period before he was informed by 
Amoco Minerals that he had been awarded the Alzada job. The 
Plaintiffs stipulate that they were uncertain of being awarded the 
Alzada Contract before they were awarded the contract by Mr. Lewis. 
However, as should be clear by now, the Plaintiffs and Mr. Lewis 
of Amoco Minerals both testified that once Mr. Lewis notified the 
Plaintiffs that the job was theirs, the uncertainty ceased. The 
job would have been performed by the Plaintiffs but for the loss 
of their logging unit caused by the Defendant. Therefore, the 
Defendant's attempt to mischaracterize Mr. Canter's testimony must 
be rejected by the Court. 
Using the foregoing mischaracterization of Mr. Canter's 
testimony as an inaccurate foundation for further argument, the 
Defendant next argues that because a written contract was never 
signed, it was speculative as to whether the Plaintiffs would have 
performed the Alzada job. To the contrary, the testimony offered 
showed that it was more than reasonably certain that the Plain-
tiffs would have performed the Amoco Minerals jobs. Mr. Lewis 
testified as follows: 
Q Now, as I understand your testimony, you didn't 
have authority to sign the final prepared contract, 
is that correct? 
A Correct. Right. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Q In the conduct of your business, during that period 
of time, did you have authority to select the con-
tractors, though? 
A I had authority to recommend the contractors. And in 
two and-a-half year's history, John Squyres has never 
gone against a geologist's recommendation. (T. 193) 
Mr. Canter testified as on cross examination as follows: 
Q Mr. Canter, isn't it customarily the practice that if 
you enter into a contract for doing work with these 
companies, that there would be a written contract? 
A Yes. 
Q And in this case there were no written contracts? 
A They were forthcoming. They ususally don't deliver 
the contracts until immediately before the work is to 
be done, customarily. 
Q Okay. And until you signed that contract, do you feel 
you are bound on those contracts? 
A No. 
Q Do you think Amoco Minerals is bound on the contract? 
A No. 
Q What you're telling me is that when Mr. Lewis called 
you on October 14th and told you that you had the pro-
ject, you didn't feel like you could hold them to it 
if they decided to change their mind on who was going 
to do the job? 
A Without a written contract, I suppose they could 
change their minds, although, historically, we have 
never had that happen once we have been officially 
contacted and awarded a contract. (T. 215-216) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, the testimony was that the Amoco Minerals geologists 
h~ve their own budgets to work with and the Plaintiffs' services 
were so greatly desired at Amoco Minerals that different Amoco 
geologists were competing with each other to obtain the Plaintiffs' 
services (T. 172). There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to 
allow the jury to find that written contracts would have been 
-9-
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signed and ~he Plaintiffs would have performed the jobs but for 
the Defendant's wrongful conduct. 
Finally, the Defendant on appeal correctly states the 
rule regarding the calculation of loss of profits from a lost 
contrac~; namely: gross contract profits less the costs of per-
forming the contract. This is exactly the rule used by the 
Plaintiffs' in presenting their evidence at trial, although at 
trial the Defendant tried to avoid this rule and the trial court 
could not grasp that this rule of law applied. As was shown by 
.the Plaintiffs' prior brief, the evidence provided by both Mr. 
Cantor and Mr. Lewis of Amoco Minerals showed that gross profits 
of no less than $37,690.40 would have been received by the Plain-
tiffs' from their lost contracts. Costs of performing the con-
tracts would have been $4,568.00, leaving a net loss to the 
Plaintiffs 1 of $33,122.40. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 16, 
' 
and 17, and the testimony of Mr. Canter and Mr. Lewis clearly 
showed how the loss was to be figured (T. 175-lBZ, 209-214). 
Unfortunately, as noted in the Plaintiffs' prior brief 
at page 30, the trial court, over the Plaintiffs' objection, 
allowed the Defendant to question the Plaintiffs regarding matters 
totally unrelated to the calculation of loss of profits from the 
lost contracts. The court improperly allowed the Defendant to 
question Canter regarding the Plaintiffs' gross income for the 
entire year even though such evidence had no bearing whatsoever 
on calculating the loss of profits from the specific lost contracts 
(T. 227-228). It was inthe context of this improper line of 
questioning that Mr. Canter stated that he could not tell what 
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the final over-all profit to the company would have been after 
general overhead was taken into account ( T. 227) ., Mr. Can L() r 
had made clear previously that the general overhead would have 
remained the same regardless of whether or not the Plaintiffs 
had per~ormed the lost contracts and that general overhead was 
not material in figuring the loss of profits from the lost con-
tracts (T. 211, 225-226). Therefore, the Defendant's attempt to 
utilize this improper line of questioning on appeal must also be 
rejected by the Court. 
As noted in the Plaintiffs' prior brief, the Defendant did 
not even move for a directed verdict on the ground that the Plain-
tiffs' damages could not be reasonably calculated. There clearly 
was sufficient evidence presented for the issue of lost profits 
to be submitted to the jury and the court erred in directing its 
verdict against the Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is replete with errors committed by the trial 
court. This Court is respectfully requested to set matters 
straight by granting to the Plaintiffs' the relief requested in 
their prior brief. 
Respectfully submitted this / 5 /-- day of/l/6Jt~,~~---.,.4?' 1982. 
---- } 
/// / ._... _,, ~- -/- -
~....- --- . / / .. ?' /-- - / --/.. // // _.,,-::;:' /. ,,,-::---_, ~ _, ?"C/'",_,/ __,,,/(:-~, / · "'?T7--/G::' .. -:c~~ 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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